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From the Chief Editor
The  International  Journal  of  Humanities  and  Social  Sciences (IJHSS)  is  a  peer-reviewed  and
refereed journal published by Al Mustafa University, Sri Lanka Branch. The main aim of IJHSS is
to  provide  an  intellectual  platform  for  local  and  international  scholars  in  order  to  promote
interdisciplinary studies in the humanities and social sciences and become a leading journal in this
field.
IJHSS publishes original papers, book reviews, conceptual frameworks, analytical and case studies,
and empirical research.  Special  issues devoted to  important topics in the humanities and social
science  will  occasionally  be  published.  The  journal  accepts  submissions  in  all  fields  of  the
humanities and social sciences, including anthropology, business studies, communication studies,
criminology,  cross-cultural  studies,  demography,  development  studies,  economics,  education,
ethics, geography, history, industrial relations, international relations, law, linguistics, media studies,
methodology,  philosophy,  political  science,  population  studies,  psychology,  sociology,  social
welfare, linguistics, literature, performing arts (music, theatre & etc.), religious studies, visual arts
and women's studies. The journal is  published both in print and online bi-annually in July and
January of each year.
This, the 2nd volume of the IJHSS, follows up on the topic of inter-religious dialogue among the
major world religions, which was also the topic of our inaugural issue. This volume contains ten
articles, written by scholars from around the world.
This volume begins with Adam L. Barborich's proposal that inter-religious dialogues focus on the
philosophical dilemmas, such as existential suffering, that underlie the soteriological / theological
elements of religious practice. It is claimed that inter-religious dialogue focused on philosophical
themes is able to bypass potential conflicts over theological / soteriological doctrines while also
avoiding relativism and respecting the distinct religious identities of participants. Colonel Barborich
contends  that  a  focus  on  philosophy,  rather  than  secular  and socio-political  concerns,  offers  a
potentially fruitful area of common ground for inter-religious dialogue.
In contrast,  S.  Ratnajeevan H. Hoole contends that inter-religious dialogue should primarily be
concerned with social action in the secular sphere due to his objections to “inter-religious worship”.
Hoole contends that a common commitment to universal human rights provides for a more tolerant
and secular approach to inter-religious dialogue. Hoole makes many excellent points in his article,
but it could be argued that the differentiation between inter-religious dialogue and inter-religious
worship needs to be clearer. Hoole's solution also leaves an open question for scholars as to whether
“universal  human  rights”,  which  are  themselves  derived  from a  Christian  world-view,   are  an
adequate basis for ethics and inter-religious dialogue?
Mohammad-Ali Savadi addresses the political dimensions of inter-religious dialogue, with special
attention paid to the intrinsic nature of mankind (fitrah) and how a religious state, alluding to the
Islamic Republic of Iran, can provide the foundation for a society in which this intrinsic human
nature may best flourish. Interestingly, Savadi points out that there does not seem to be a great deal
of work in the area of an Islamic philosophical anthropology. This is available insight that serves to
direct scholars towards this valuable area of research and to further the development of Islamic
political philosophy.
Amini Golestani and Rahim Dehghan provide the reader with an overview of the position of inter-
religious dialogue in the Holy Qur'an. Golestani details the historical relationship between inter-
faith dialogue as da'wah in Islam and the place of inter-faith dialogue in Christian-Muslim relations,
particularly in the 7th century CE. Deghan provides a detailed analysis of the principles and methods
for inter-religious dialogue found in the Qur'an, and both Golestani and Deghan open up a valuable
avenue of enquiry by illustrating that Qur'anic inter-faith dialogue involves an invitation to Islam
and is always directed towards people of the book in the Qur'an itself. Deghan puts forth the idea
that this  perspective should be expanded to other faiths, particularly Eastern religions and New
Religious Movements (NRM), yet we do not have a model for how this type of inter-faith dialogue
can best be translated into inter-religious dialogue with the non-Abrahamic religions, or if inter-
religious dialogue ultimately consists of anything other than  da'wah from an Islamic perspective.
These are potentially valuable areas of exploration to be taken up by other scholars in the future.
Moussa Serge Traore provides a detailed analysis of the God of Islam from a Catholic theological
perspective and notes that in spite of theological differences between the two faiths, from a Catholic
perspective,  both  can  be  said  to  worship  the  same God.  Robert  Catalano also  takes  a  look  at
dialogue from a Catholic perspective by situating Pope Francis'  Evangelii Gaudium in the context
of  papal  doctrine  since  Vatican  II.  These  articles  are  very  helpful  for  helping  one  understand
contemporary Catholic approaches to inter-religious and inter-faith dialogue.
Moragaswewe Vijitha gives an account of what the primary sources have to say about a Buddhist
perspective on religious diversity and how the teaching of comparative religion may aid Sri Lanka
in its post-war recovery, but his argument for how this constitutes a Buddhist approach to post-war
reconciliation  is  under-developed.  Likewise,  Mohamed  Shareef  Asees'  article  addresses  a  very
interesting and important topic that needs to be discussed in present-day Sri Lanka, but it is written
in  an  editorial  style  and  many  of  the  arguments  lack  supporting  evidence.  Nevertheless,  both
subjects  are  worthy  of  further  discussion  and it  is  hoped that  these  ideas  are  taken up by the
academic community in future.   
This  volume closes  with  a  book  review by  Laksiri  Fernando  of  Douglas  Pratt's  Religion  and
Extremism: Rejecting Diversity, a 2018 release from Bloomsbury Publishing.  
We would like to invite you to submit your papers for the next volume and we can be reached at
journal@miu.lk or http://ijhss.miu.lk/
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Abstract
Philosophy of religion, approached from a comparative perspective, can be a valuable tool for advancing inter-religious
dialogue. Unfortunately, “comparative religion” today is usually characterised by two extreme positions: 
1) Comparing religions in order to come to the conclusion that one's own religion is superior
2) Arguing for a type of “religious pluralism” that relativises all religious truth claims.
The former approach reduces religion to a confrontational form of apologetics, theatrical “debates” and polemics, while
the latter reduces religion to a mere acceptance of pragmatically useful  perspectivist  narratives devoid of absolute
reality or truth. 
Inter-religious  dialogue  should  follow  a  middle  path  between  these  two  extremes  by  engaging  with  underlying
philosophical themes that are common to all religious traditions instead of emphasising the comparison of theological
and soteriological arguments that may depend on justifications that are exclusive to a particular religious practice. The
philosophical theme explored here is that of dissatisfaction and existential suffering in an imperfect world, a theme
found in all “world religions”. Indeed, the diagnosis of this existential predicament and the hope that religious practice
may allow one to overcome it appears to be universal, while its causes and the prescribed remedies differ considerably
among  religious  traditions.  Nevertheless,  inter-religious  dialogue  beginning  from  a  conviction  that  all  religious
practitioners  strive  for  truth  and  salvation  in  response  to  a  common  existential  experience  may  lead  to  a  more
compassionate and productive dialogue between religious communities. This type of inter-religious dialogue avoids
accusations  of  falling  into  religious  syncretism or  relativism while  encouraging  diverse  religious  communities  to
address contemporary issues from areas of philosophical common ground.  This allows for a more fruitful type of inter-
religious dialogue and comparative study of religion that can be pursued while maintaining one's own distinct religious
identities and particular religious truths.
Keywords: Philosophy of religion, comparative religion, Inter-religious dialogue, religious existentialism, the problem
of existential suffering 
In  order  to  be  fruitful,  inter-religious  dialogue  must  further  both  religion  and  dialogue
simultaneously, not one, the other or neither. It is therefore essential to find common ground among
religious traditions while maintaining respect for the places in which there are divergences among
the religious. This is usually accomplished by focusing on dialogue about common areas of public
interest in which various religions have a common, often political, goal towards which they can
work together. This type of engagement is undoubtedly beneficial [2] and its focus on shared action
is commendable. However, it tends to follow the traditional Anglo-Protestant model of trying to
create  a  separate  private  sphere  for  religious  activity  as  opposed to  a  secular  public  sphere  of
engagement with the community. It also reduces the process to dialogue about the shared interests
of the religious rather than a dialogue about what their religions mean to religious practitioners and
what their traditions have to offer the world. We contend that it is the latter type of dialogue, one
that  puts  the  religious  at  the  centre  of  inter-religious  dialogue,  that  is  best  suited  to  advance
meaningful human relationships between people of different religions as well as the relationship
between people and God, or the transcendent. This type of engagement will advance the goal of
fostering respect, rather than mere tolerance of different religious traditions, love of one's neighbour
and peace.  
Philosophy of religion, approached from a comparative perspective, can be a valuable tool for inter-
religious dialogue. Unfortunately, “comparative religion” today is often characterised by attempts at
comparing religions in order to come to the conclusion that one's own religion is superior to all
others or arguing that all religions are ultimately “the same thing”. The former approach reduces
inter-religious dialogue to a confrontational form of apologetics, theatrical “debates” and polemics,
while  the  latter  relativises  and  reduces  religion  to  a  mere  acceptance  of  pragmatically  useful
perspectivist narratives devoid of absolute reality or truth. 
These  approaches  are  unsuccessful  and often  counter-productive.  We contend that  comparative
philosophy of religion can lead inter-religious dialogue in a more fruitful direction by engaging with
underlying philosophical themes that are common to all religious traditions instead of emphasising
the comparison of theological and soteriological arguments that may depend on justifications that
are exclusive to a particular religious practice. This approach emphasises the aspect of philosophical
dialogue in inter-religious dialogue, while at  the same time addressing issues that are primarily
religious rather than common social aims in the secular environment.
This  is  not  a  new  approach.  In  the  Indian  tradition,  there  was  much  interaction  between  the
predecessors of the orthodox Ãstika schools of Hinduism and the heterodox Nāstika traditions of
the śrama a schools. The texts of the Buddhists and the Jains attest to the interactions between theirṇ
followers  and  those  of  other  śrama a  traditions,  as  personified  by  the  six  heretics  in  theṇ
Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Buddhist Pāli Canon. This engagement continued for centuries, and is
found  in  the  writings  of  Ãdi  Śa karācārya  and  the  legends  of  his  debates  throughout  theṅ
subcontinent. Among the ancient Greek philosophers, particularly Pythagoras and Plato, one can
also find an emphasis on religious concerns. 
What makes Plato a philosopher, and not merely the founder of a quasi-religious sect, is that
his metaphysics with its theory of Forms is based on logical argumentation. But the 
hypostatizing of the Forms, the bold assertion that there is another world in which they have 
their being, the depreciation of the world of sense in favor of this other world—all this is not
required by logic... There must be another world: the world of the soul, [3] where the soul 
has its being before birth and after death. And having fallen back on these ancient religious 
ideas, Plato had made room for a world in which absolute justice and absolute beauty could 
have real existence instead of being mere concepts. His more strictly logical inquiries had 
convinced him of the crucial importance of these concepts, but the postulation of another 
world in which these "Ideas" were at home was not necessitated by logic. This theory had 
religious roots; but it was probably the impression that Socrates had made on him that led 
him to it. (Kaufmann, 1961)
The  followers  of  Plato  pressed  forward  with  the  religious  aspects  of  his  work.  Aristotle's
metaphysics and natural theology, as well as the work of the neo-Platonists, grounded the religious
views of classical and medieval philosophers in Christianity, Judaism and Islam. An inter-religious
dialogue of sorts took place between Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Boethius, Al-
Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, Maimonides, Aquinas, etc. This “dialogue” took place through their
texts over centuries and greatly influenced each of their respective faiths. It is also highly likely that
there was some interaction, possibly reciprocal, between the Indo-Greek Kingdoms in South Asia
and the Indian philosophical and religious traditions. We contend that this is the model that should
be followed in inter-religious dialogue today. It is easy to imagine these great philosophers and
teachers seated around a table engaging in philosophical dialogue. It seems unlikely that any of
these philosophers would have risen from the table as a convert to another religion, but from the
way in which they incorporated the philosophy of others into their own systems it does seem likely
that all of them would have taken something from the others to enhance their own religions. Each
would have been likely to leave the table with a great respect for the traditions of his companions as
well. Here lies the real promise of comparative philosophy of religion in inter-religious dialogue.
This is unsurprising given that throughout the world philosophy has traditionally never been about
mere speculative articulation and the critique of various views. Instead, it was vitally concerned
with coming to know the nature of all things and how the knowledge acquired in this investigation
serves to unveil the mysteries of lived experience and inform human conduct.
Philosophy is  the enterprise  of constructing and assessing categorial  systems. Much of  
Ancient,  Medieval,  and  Modern  philosophy  was  deliberately  pursued  systematically.  
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant all 
constructed complex systems of philosophy. Their intent was, as a later philosopher put it, 
“to  see  things,  and see  them whole”  –  to  develop  an  integrated  account  of  things,  of  
knowledge, and of ethics. (Yandell, 1999)
When  approached  in  this  holistic  and  systematic  way,  the  artificially  drawn  lines  between
philosophy,  religion  and  a  “way  of  life”  become  exceedingly  blurred.  We  shall  explore  this
relationship by using two definitions of religion put forth by Yandell (1999). The first is essential
and substantive: [4]
Religion makes use of the notions of diagnosis and cure. A religion proposes a diagnosis (an 
account of what it takes the basic problem facing human beings to be) and a cure (a way of 
permanently and desirably solving that problem).
In this definition, religion offers a diagnosis of and solution to man's existential predicament. As
religious  practices  geared  towards  each  particular  diagnosis  and  cure  develop,  they  become
increasingly  rationalised  and  subjected  to  opposing  arguments.  This  results  in  each  religious
tradition  continually  refining  and  logically  defending  its  positions.  The  resulting  philosophical
doctrine, rooted in the original religious diagnosis of and solution to man's existential predicament,
is  then  incorporated  by  the  religious  practitioners  of  each  tradition  into  their  individual  and
communal “way of life”. This is in keeping with Yandell's (1999) second, functional, definition of
religion:
A religion is a conceptual system that provides an interpretation of the world and the place 
of human beings in it, bases an account of how life should be lived given that interpretation, 
and expresses this interpretation and lifestyle in a set of rituals, institutions, and practices.
The primary conceptual systems found in religions are exemplified in their metaphysical accounts
of the eternity of the world / creation, divine revelation, the ultimate nature of reality, the nature of
the  God  /  the  metadivine  realm  (Kaufmann,  1960),  the  grounding  of  morals  and  moral
responsibility, the problem of free will, the problem of evil and the afterlife. These problems are
common to all world religions and there is space here for inter-religious dialogue to engage with the
underlying philosophical themes that are common to all. The philosophical theme explored in this
article is that of dissatisfaction and existential suffering in a fallen or imperfect world, a theme
found in all world religions. Indeed, the diagnosis of this existential predicament and the hope that
religious practice may allow one to overcome it appear to be universal, while the causes of this
predicament and the remedies prescribed for it differ considerably among religious traditions. 
Buddhism diagnoses man's existential predicament as one of universal suffering, known in the Pāli
language as dukkha. The word dukkha has a wide range of meanings and can be translated as angst,
anxiety,  distress,  dread,  insufficiency,  pain,  suffering,  unease  or  unsatisfactoriness.
Unsatisfactoriness is often used as the preferred translation today due to the fact that the common
translation  of  dukkha  as  “suffering”  in  English  is  thought  to  carry  with  it  a  sense  of  extreme
hardship and pain, whereas the word dukkha can refer to anything from excruciating physical pain
to a seemingly trivial worry. In this work, we will speak of existential suffering, because it best
conveys  the  range  of  feelings  that  arises  from  conscious  human  existence  in  an  intrinsically
unsatisfactory world that can never offer that which human beings most desire.
However,  this  same  existential  predicament  lies  at  the  heart  of  all  religions.  The  substantial
differences between religions lie in precisely where each locates the [5] source of the problem of
existential  suffering  and  the  source  of  its  solution.  Nevertheless,  each  religion  identifies  the
presence of a profound sense of dissatisfaction and unease in mortal life while offering different
explanations and soteriologies as remedies for this existential  predicament. These differences in
approach to the problem of suffering among religions are amenable to clarification and exploration
by way of comparative philosophy. This is the aim of our study here. 
An example that demonstrates the overlap between ostensibly religious and philosophical goals and
validates  Yandell's  definition  of  religion  as  diagnosis  and  cure  is  found  in  the  oft-repeated
comparisons of philosophy and religion with the art of medicine. One of the earliest comparisons
between philosophy and medicine is attributed to Democritus [DK 31], “Medicine heals illnesses of
the body, wisdom removes passions from the soul” (Graham, 2010). According to Berges, Plato
took this health analogy very seriously and we find many similar accounts where Plato draws an
analogy between virtue  and health  (Berges,  2012).  In  Gorgias [475d]  Socrates  is  presented  as
asking Polus to submit himself to the argument as if to a doctor. In  Phaedrus [270b-e] Socrates
likens the art of rhetoric to the healing art of the physician and assents to the method used by the
famous physician Hippocrates for analysing the body being used to analyse the soul. In  Republic
[444c-e] Plato states:
To act  unjustly  and be  unjust  and in  turn to  act  justly  the meaning of  all  these terms  
becomes at once plain and clear, since injustice and justice are so... these are in the soul  
what the healthful and the diseaseful are in the body; there is no difference... Healthful  
things surely engender health and diseaseful disease... Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a  
kind of  health  and beauty and good condition of the soul,  and vice would be disease,  
ugliness, and weakness. (Plato, 1969)
The analogy between medicine and ethics was also used by Plato's student Aristotle. For Aristotle,
ethics  and  medicine  are  both  practical  arts;  he  refers  to  the  medical  model  throughout  his
Nicomachean Ethics. Jaeger (1957) states that Aristotle considers medicine to be the “paragon of
the right method” for ethical discipline. The analogy appears to have gone both ways with the great
physician  Galen,  as  he  titled  one  of  his  medical  treatises  Quod  optimus  medicus  sit  quoque
philosophus, which is Latin for “that the best physician is also a philosopher”.
The analogy between philosophy and medicine appears again in the work of the medieval Christian
philosopher Boethius (1999).  In The Consolation of Philosophy, Lady Philosophy appears as the
personification of philosophy to comfort Boethius who is unjustly imprisoned. Boethius refers to
her explicitly as “my physician” and “my nurse in whose house I had been cared for since my
youth”, after Lady Philosophy diagnosed him with “a touch of amnesia... the common disease of
deluded minds”. After making her diagnosis, Lady Philosophy refers to her teaching as medicines
and remedies  and refers to Boethius'  forgetfulness of his  true nature as the major  cause of his
illness.
[6] In Islam, the instruction of Allah is said to heal the hearts of believers (Qur'an 10:57; 26:80) and
to serve as  a cure for  those who believe (Qur'an 41:44).   The Hebrew Bible also ascribes the
ultimate healing power to the law-giving God (Ex 15:26) and it is notable that some of the greatest
philosophers  of  the  medieval  period,  such as  Ibn Sina,  Ibn Rushd and Maimonides,  were  also
renowned physicians. 
It is clear that philosophy, religion and medicine often share a model of diagnosis and healing and
can  be  broadly  categorised  as  therapeutic  or  salvific.  Even  the  analytic  philosopher  Ludwig
Wittgenstein  (1958)  uses  the  medical  model  like  his  predecessors,  stating  in  Philosophical
Investigations [133]  that  the  "philosopher's  treatment  of  a  question  is  like  the  treatment  of  an
illness". He also compares philosophical methods to different therapies. Wittgenstein's therapies are
similar to those of his ancient predecessors in that they seem to involve a soteriological dimension.
These  therapies  are  aimed  at  the  complete  liberation  of  the  philosopher  from  philosophical
problems [255]. Wittgenstein claims that his aim in philosophy is nothing short of salvation from
philosophical problems; he wants to “show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” [309].
In Wittgenstein's formulation, philosophy takes on a religious significance not only by offering a
diagnosis and cure for the problem of existential suffering, but an escape from the problem itself.
What is this way out offered by philosophy and philosophical religion an escape from? Among
those who are opposed to religion, it is commonly thought that it  is an escape from one's own
mortality by way of wishful thinking. However, in fact, it is an answer to the recognition of one's
own immortality and the attendant problem of existential suffering and terror in the face of that
immortality.
 
In his relation to death man is unique among the animal species, and indeed doubly unique. 
For alone among the animals he knows that he is going to die; and further, he not only  
knows it but – in an important sense – does not believe it! As far back as we are able to find 
traces of distinctively human life we find that man has done something which no other  
species does: he has buried the corpses of his own kind, or otherwise deliberately disposed 
of them, thus revealing a sense of the special significance of death. Further, these evidences 
show that he did not think of death as the cessation of existence. (Hick, 1994)
This conception of what the afterlife consisted of varied greatly among human beings. Among the
most common eschatologies were continual cycles of reincarnation into one's own clan, one's own
species and /  or across innumerable realms of existence.  Often these rebirth eschatologies were
supplemented by an intermediate existence in shadowy realms, while other cultures pictured the
afterlife as an eternally diminished existence in these same shadowy realms populated by the ghosts
of the dead. Other cultures turned these underworlds into heavens and hells where the departed
would be sent for reward or punishment in accordance with their earthly deeds. In spite of the
variety of beliefs about the afterlife,  belief  in an afterlife has been universal throughout human
history and “far from being a matter  [7] of wish fulfillment, an afterlife, as pictured by ancient
cultures, was not particularly desirable, just inevitable” (Baker, 2007). 
Just as belief in the afterlife is universal among human beings, the attendant problem of existential
suffering has been a part of philosophy and religion throughout human history and in this sense
there is little to differentiate between the philosophical and religious sciences. However, we would
regard  the  science  of  existential  suffering  and  its  cure,  particularly  in  the  context  of  eternity,
primarily as religious philosophy.
The  Buddhist  account  of  existential  suffering  is  both  sophisticated  and  subtle.  The  Buddhist
recognises that simply by existing, one is condemned to purposeless suffering by the inherently
unsatisfactory nature of that conditioned existence. Of course, this can be said of all sentient beings
and one does  not  have  to  struggle  to  imagine  the  suffering  of  animals  who are  threatened by
predation,  harassed  by  parasites,  subjected  to  changes  in  weather,  injury,  hunger,  thirst,  etc.
However, for animals, suffering is largely confined to the realm of ordinary suffering caused by
painful sensations and the inability to attain what they need for sustenance. The animal suffers like
all sentient beings, but it is only conscious of its immediate desires, which are geared towards the
necessities needed for its continued survival. The animal likely does not dread future deprivation
and is not aware of its impending mortality. The predator kills without compunction or remorse
because it  must.  It  is  driven by instinct rather than volition.  In the animal  realm the weak are
devoured by the strong without any regard for concepts such as right and wrong. Although animals
are conscious beings and many species may have a far more complex and nuanced thought life than
they are usually credited with, it is unlikely that animals have any conception of a possible world in
which life does not feed off death.
This state in which all life feeds off death is referred to in Indian philosophy as the “law of the fish”
(Sanskrit. matsyanyaya). This is synonymous with the “law of the jungle” in English and refers to
the state of nature in which the small fish is inevitably preyed upon by bigger fish that are in turn
preyed upon by still bigger fish. This is a world in which the strong devour the weak as a matter of
course. An animal in this situation may live what appears to a human to be a brutal life driven by
blind instinct, but the predator that kills to ensure its own survival is apparently untroubled by this.
If the predator is mortally injured, its suffering is very real, but it occurs at the level of sensation
and with no apparent fear of its impending death or what will follow. The predator is aware only of
its immediate situation and its comfort or discomfort. It does not appear to possess awareness of its
existential  predicament  as  a  mortal  creature.  Its  situation  is  comparable  to  that  of  Rabbi
Soloveitchik's  (1964)  created,  primordial  “natural  man”,  in  that  the  predator's  existence  “is
unbounded, merging harmoniously with the general order of things and events”.
The self-evident existence of suffering becomes a matter of existential import in the complexity of
human  consciousness.  Human  beings  have  evolved  beyond  the  state  of  pre-conscious  “natural
man”. The possession of complex higher-order  [8] consciousness by “real man”, which “natural
man”  lacks,  is  what  brings  existential  suffering  to  the  forefront.  With  the  possession  of  self-
consciousness,  man also becomes conscious  of  his  own fragility  and mortality.  This leads  to  a
recognition of the mortality of others and an understanding of the absolute impossibility of avoiding
the destruction of other sentient beings in the course of ensuring one's own survival. This forces
man to face the nature of the reality in which he is immersed and to contrast his conscious desire for
life, immutability and permanence with his conscious perception of a world of change, death and
impermanence. Merely by having come into existence, the man is trapped in this web of existential
suffering.
“Natural man” becomes “real man” as soon as he becomes conscious of this grisly duty to kill other
beings in order to ensure his own survival and as he becomes aware of his own vulnerability to
being killed by others or by circumstances beyond his control. This creates in him both fear for his
own life and a sense of disgust with the necessity of killing other living beings. The myth of the fall
of man in the Garden of Eden attests to the disorientation that was brought about by the emergence
of human consciousness and the primordial longing for a time in which “natural man” was not
alienated from his environment. In eating the fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, the
first humans’ “eyes were opened” and they became like gods, “knowing good and evil” (Gn 3:5)
while also coming to know death. This knowledge of good and evil can be likened to the fact that
man comes to see himself as a subject and the external world as an object and he is forced to
acknowledge the horrors he must perpetrate in order to secure his own survival. Man is able to
know things in the same manner that a god would, but at the same time, the knowledge of his
inevitable death demonstrates that his own nature is quite different from the nature of a god. 
Man, in his encounter with an objective world and in his assumption of the role of a subject 
who asks questions about something hitherto simple, forfeits his sense of serenity and peace.
He is no longer happy, he begins to examine his station in this world and he finds himself 
suddenly assailed by perplexity and fear, and especially loneliness... The I-experience is a 
passional  one  and  real  man  is  born  amid  the  pains  of  confrontation  with  an  "angry"  
environment of which he had previously been an integral part. (Soloveitchik, 1964)
Man's confrontation with this newly alien world leads to an aspiration to transcend his own being,
to reconcile himself with his environment and restore the harmony that was lost. At the same time,
the recognition that this reconciliation may be unachievable leads to a sense of privation, a profound
unhappiness, self-contempt and suffering. In this sense, the tale of the fall of man in the Garden of
Eden  can  be  read  as  a  story  of  the  origins  of  existential  suffering  in  the  emergence  of  self-
consciousness, as an expression of man's yearning to return to a pre-conscious state and as a tale of
the entry of moral responsibility into the human condition. 
The concept of moral responsibility entering the world in the Genesis myth is often analysed in
terms of guilt and sin, particularly in Christianity. Guilt and sin should be considered as technical
terms rather than as theologically loaded or negative [9] concepts. Guilt is nothing more than the
feeling of remorse and acceptance of responsibility for one's actions. The meaning of the Koine
Greek word for sin μαρτίαἁ , means something like “to miss the mark”, “to fail” or “to be in error”.
In this  sense, sin is inevitable for the human being, occurring whenever one falls  into error or
misses the mark in living up to a moral standard. Augustine's development of the concept of original
sin in Latin Christianity sought an answer to the problem of the existence of sin in a world created
by a omni-benevolent God. This is a very different perspective from that of the Indian thinkers who
did not accept a creator deity. Nevertheless, original sin, like dukkha, is also an existential condition
in which one simply finds oneself; the condition brings with it a sense of suffering, unease and
dissatisfaction  with  the  self-directed  conscious  life  that  seems to  perpetually  “miss  the  mark”.
Augustine finds the main cause of existential suffering in the movement from a perfect human life
that is “faultless and without sin” (Augustine, 1887) in the Garden of Eden, to an imperfect and
unsatisfactory  existence  in  thrall  to  disordered  inclinations  in  much  the  same way  that  Indian
thinkers trace the causes of existential suffering to ignorance and delusion. 
Although his own religion rejects any notions of inherited sin or guilt on theological grounds, in
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Muhammad Iqbal (2013) also describes the state
in which Adam and his wife lived in the Garden to be one in which “man is practically unrelated to
his environment and consequently does not feel the sting of human wants”. Although the Islamic
account of the Genesis myth differs in many ways from its presentation in Judaism and Christianity,
the interpretive theme of  the root  of existential  suffering being found in the development  of a
distinctive human self-consciousness remains the same. 
We see that the Qur'anic legend of the Fall has nothing to do with the first appearance  of  
man on this planet. Its purpose is rather to indicate man's rise from a primitive state of  
instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a  free  self,  capable  of  doubt  and  
disobedience. The Fall does not mean any moral  depravity;  it  is  man's  transition  from  
simple consciousness to the first flash of self-consciousness, a kind of waking from the  
dream of nature with a throb of personal causality in one's own being. (Iqbal, 2013)
In the same way that the Genesis myth is used by the Abrahamic religions to illustrate the origins of
existential suffering, Kaufmann (1961) uses the pagan Greek tragedies to demonstrate the tragic
inevitability of error and guilt in the world. Tragedy arises from “situations in which one cannot act,
nor abstain from action, without incurring guilt”, even in cases where the situation is not caused by
oneself. The inevitable occurrence of morally problematic situations leads to recognition of the fact
that man's life in this world is a tragic predicament. This is especially true if such suffering is seen
as essentially purposeless, rather than as part of a religious destiny playing out in the context of
history. The latter cannot be tragic because the latter serves an “idea that will triumph eventually”
and there can be no tragedy in such circumstances. This points towards a very distinct difference
between the Abrahamic religions that unfold in the context of history and the ancient Greek and
Indian  religions  which  are  practised  in  the  context  of  an  eternally  existent  cosmos.  [10] It  is
therefore unsurprising that both Greek tragedy and Indian Buddhism acknowledge aimless suffering
as the tragic condition in which human existence takes place. 
However, in all of these accounts of existential suffering, man lives in a world that is unsatisfactory
and he is perpetually inclined to fall into ignorance, forgetfulness and error. Man also aspires to
escape  this  suffering  and  to  transcend  his  finitude.  It  is  clear  that  the  development  of  self-
consciousness and the “I-experience” are ultimately at the root of human suffering in an existential
sense as well as being the root of man's religious nature. The foundation of all existential suffering
is found in the inability of man to satisfy his cravings to either return to the pre-conscious state of
“natural man” or to attain consciousness of the eternal, permanent and unchanging to which “real
man” aspires.
We hope that by engaging with this foundational religious problem of existential suffering, we can
point to one area of common ground that is fruitful for inter-religious dialogue through comparative
study. In spite of the fact that the theological and soteriological differences between all of the world
religions  are  quite  substantial,  it  also  is  apparent  that  all  are  responding  to  the  philosophical
diagnosis  of  a  universal  problem (at  least  one,  possibly  more)  and  are  seeking  solutions  in  a
universal religious impulse. Inter-religious dialogue beginning from the conviction that all religious
practitioners strive for truth and salvation in response to a common existential experience may lead
to a more compassionate and productive dialogue between religious communities. 
Inter-religious  dialogue  focused  on  themes  like  existential  suffering  investigated  by  using
philosophical methods is also able to bypass potential conflicts over theological / soteriological
doctrines  while  avoiding  relativism.  The  ability  of  each  religious  tradition  to  present  its  own
diagnosis and cure to universal problems like that of existential suffering philosophically provides
common ground for dialogue about a shared problem of religious concern without contributing to
perceptions of syncretism or proselytisation. This may also help others to feel comfortable with
engaging in inter-religious dialogue by making the environment less threatening. 
Finally, addressing contemporary religious issues from areas of philosophical common ground may
actually allow for a more truly religious type of inter-religious dialogue while respecting the distinct
religious  identities  and  particular  religious  truths  of  the  participants  due  to  its  focus  on  more
traditionally religious, rather than socio-political concerns. Whereas shared interests in the socio-
political domain offers common ground for inter-religious dialogue it often has no use for concepts
such  as  metaphysics  and  the  immaterial  that  are  central  to  most  forms  of  religiously-oriented
philosophical discourse. A philosophical approach to inter-religious dialogue may also serve to pave
the way for more extensive comparative studies of religion and lead to new breakthroughs in the
philosophy  of  religion  while  encouraging  participants  in  inter-religious  dialogue  to  better
understand their own religion, increase their knowledge of the religions of their neighbours and
engage in important cross-cultural, as well as inter-religious, dialogue. [11]
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